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Abstract
The basis of the capability approach (CA) was recently attacked by a paper
by Prasanta Pattanaik and Yonghseng Xu: the CA is strongly committed to
two substantial principles, dominance on the one hand, and relativism on
the other hand. The authors have shown these two principles, along with a
harmless continuity condition, are together inconsistent. The aim of this paper
is twofold. On the one hand, it provides a discussion on the interpretation of
this result, based on a reading of the literature on the CA, which brings to the
fore the diversity of the approaches. On the second hand, it aims at proposing
a way out from the impossibility, which yields to further discussions of Sen’s
CA.
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1 Introduction
In their ‘Minimal relativism, dominance, and standard of living comparisons based
on functionings’, Prasanta Pattanaik and Yongsheng Xu have recently1 raised an
important problem in the capability approach of standards of living, likely to disturb
the grounds of the framework and, henceforth, its conclusions and the justifications
for its application. They propose a formal approach of a conception of the standard
of living based on the functioning bundles and the capability sets. Two conditions
capture each of the essential features of the capability approach, to both of which
Sen is explicitly committed: relativism on the one hand, monotonicity over bundles
of functionings on the other hand. They show that, along with a somewhat harmless
continuity condition, these two conditions are incompatible. The result primarily
applies on the functionings space, where the relevant comparisons apply to the
standard of living, written (i, x), but it is easily generalized on the capability space
written (i, x, A), of a person i ∈ N , achieving the set of functionings x ∈ X chosen
within the set of capabilities A ∈ Z. Therefore, it is a general result to understand
the CA, as long as the conditions are considered faithful to it.
This paper is aimed at discussing the interpretation of this result and at propos-
ing tracks to go beyond the impossibility. I will show how each normative conditions,
minimal relativism and weak dominance, carries a specific notion of freedom (sec-
tion 2), which generates a challenging interpretation of the result (section 3) which
reveals to be focused on Sen’s capability approach, rather than applied to any of
the capability approaches (section 4). This discussion gives tracks to go beyond the
result (section 5). Last section concludes (section 6).
2 Two notions of freedom in Sen’s capability ap-
proach
The authors have justified the use of the two normative conditions, minimal rel-
ativism and weak dominance, ‘on their own sake’. They should hold ‘in general’
because an acceptance of the converse would seem counter-intuitive, or have dis-
1The result at stake has been presented a few times before its publication, notably during the
workshop linked with the Condorcet lectures by Amartya Sen held in Caen in june 2005, and at
the presidential address of the 8th Social Choice and Welfare meeting held in Istanbul in july 2006.
See Pattanaik and Xu 2006.
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gusting consequences. Their result should apply to the functioning approach(es)
and to the capability approach(es) of the standard of living if and only if we find
these two conditions, in their actual formulation, to be compelling to capture one
and the other. I propose to interpret and justify these two conditions in consistency
with the literature on the capability approach2 – henceforth CA – and show how
and for which specific approach they should hold. The resulting interpretation will
prove slightly different from the authors’.
The authors justify weak dominance the following way : “Weak dominance is
a compelling condition, given that the functionings are the doings and beings that
people value and represent desirable attributes. It stipulates that a person with a
bigger functioning bundle must have at least as high standard of living as a person
with a smaller functioning bundle.” The formulation of this condition requires to
specify the level of each functioning and not just its type; it therefore amounts
to the valuation of achieved functionings for themselves, as opposed to potential
functionings. The valuation of achieved functionings captures the outcome aspect of
freedom, linked with the beings and doings a person manage to achieve all together,
therefore to the achieved outcome she does value. This condition hence captures the
instrumental value of freedom: “ If freedom had only instrumental importance for
a person’s well-being and no intrinsic relevance, then it would be appropriate – in
the evaluation of well-being – to identify the value of the capability set simply with
the value of the chosen functioning combination. This will coincide with valuing a
capability set by the value of the best element [...] of this set if the person does in
fact choose in a way that maximizes his or her well-being.” (Sen 1992: 50–51) This
personal choice defines typically a subjective judgment (see Nussbaum 1988: 176,
Sumner 1996: 63). A direct formulation of this idea would be that, whenever x is
bigger than y, (i, x) º (i, y). It is important to specify who will assess this situation
– here, mister i – for the very fact that two different persons – i and j – may consider
different functionings as being relevant. As a matter of fact, Sen has always refused
to propose a definitive list of (basic/primary) functionings for the sake of pluralism
(Sen, 1993b). Hence, mister i is likely to select different dimensions in the space of
functionings than miss j. In other words, the space X, i.e. the set of functionings, in
which it is meaningful to order x and y is not homogenous for all persons : “the list
of functionings reflects a view of what is valuable and what is of not intrinsic value”,
as identified by each individual for his own sake (Sen 1987: 29). In Pattanaik
and Xu’s paper, the weak dominance condition writes: for all i, j ∈ N , for all
x, y ∈ X, whenever x is bigger than y, (i, x) º (j, y). This formulation incorporates
2The literature on the capability approach is indeed very wide. See for instance Robeyns 2000,
2005, and Alkire 2002 for a presentation of the different views and levels of studies.
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restrictions on interpersonal comparisons of living standards: the outcome aspect
of freedom is wider when a person manages to achieve more doings of beings than
less, no matter who this person is. This distinction may seem quite problematic in
the sense that it assumes the unicity, hence the comparability of the dimensions,
unfaithfully to Sen’s project. Yet, this limit should not be taken too seriously. First
of all, Sen’s thought proves sufficiently consistent to give birth to some pre-selected
list of functionings, that could be considered valuable to any human being, whatever
his moral values (see Sen 1980, Croker 1995: 174–176). Secondly, Sen agrees some
lower degree of sophistication of his approach is acceptable, allowing a focus on a list
of basic functionings in empirical applications to study the quality of life in concrete
settings, out of a pragmatic acceptance of limitations of data availability (Sen 1992:
52–53). Lastly, Sen does not refuse to conceive the existence of such a list for a given
society, he just considers it is not the task of the theorist but that of the democratic
process to generate such a list (Sen 2004). As a first conclusion, weak dominance
captures the idea of the instrumental value of freedom, according to a commonly
accepted list of functionings, but we have to keep in mind this corresponds to a
specific interpretation of Sen’s approach.
According to Pattanaik and Xu, “minimal relativism may be viewed as an expres-
sion of one’s desire to accord some respect to differences on the norms and standards
with which different individuals or different communities evaluate functionings bun-
dle. [...] We shall treat minimal relativism as having enough direct intuitive appeal
to be treated as a primitive condition in its own right.” This condition captures
the idea that individuals may choose the kind of life they have reasons to value (see
Sen 1999: 95), and that there is no single idea of the good life but a diversity to
generate a collective judgment. If Sen is very committed to this view, it is not the
case of the CA as a whole. In Sen’s approach, the locus where a diversity of kinds of
lives is valued is the capability set, taken as a set of different achievable functionings
bundles (written A ∈ Z), as opposed to the achieved functioning bundle (written
x ∈ X). Two persons in the exact same situation, facing the same commodities
and the same capability set, are likely to use them in different ways and eventually
achieve different levels and types of functionings. Because they may have different
tastes, different project of life, different moral values, they might want to make a
different use of the same capability set to achieve a specific bundle of functionings:
‘drinking mineral water and walking’ is a kind of life different and as valuable than
that of ‘drinking fine claret and driving a fancy car’. Setting that the scope of dif-
ferent functioning bundle (the capability set) has a value besides the value of the
chosen and achieved functioning bundle supposes a further assumption: all projects
of life are equally valuable, even though they might be inconsistent with one an-
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other, even though a person could not by herself appreciate two different kinds of
life, there is no universal way to judge what a better life would be. If we want to re-
spect that diversity of views, a necessary condition is to accept that different persons
may have contradictory preferences over functionings. Therefore, it is possible that
two different persons may have exact opposite rankings over functionings bundles,
which amounts to the definition of the minimal relativism condition. Further, to
capture the valuation of capabilities, it would be necessary to introduce a measure
of the scope of diverse kinds of life available in a situation, hence a measure of the
scope of the capability set. The choice of one project of life rather than another is
materialized through the selection of one functionings vector through the scope of all
available functionings vectors. The actual choice is wider when the scope of choice
(of functioning sets) is wider: you have more capabilities when you have a wider
scope of projects of life. What is important for one’s life is not just to accomplish
things, but also that the person is able to choose to kind of life he or she has reasons
to value. Besides the outcome aspect of freedom, the valuation of capabilities allows
to focus on the opportunity aspect of freedom: the possibility to choose and have
some control over one kind of life (see Sen, 1993). As functionings, capabilities may
be a basic aim of social and economic policies (see Sen, 1988). As a second conclu-
sion, even though the relativism condition formalized by Pattanaik and Xu does not
capture all the idea of the opportunity aspect of freedom through the valuation of
capabilities, it does constitute a necessary condition for it to hold. Then requiring
minimal relativism condition amounts to valuing the opportunity aspect of freedom.
3 Challenging the interpretation of the result
Bringing to the fore the distinction between functionings and capabilities, we have
shown that two values, each captured by one of the two conditions formulated by
Pattanaik and Xu, are carried out through Sen’s approach: the outcome aspect
of freedom and the opportunity aspect of freedom. “It is important to distinguish
between freedom (reflected by capability) and achievement (reflected by actual func-
tionings)” (Sen 1992:83; see also Sen 1992:50).
The weak dominance condition is close to the commitment to utility in the
freedom of choice literature3: the weak dominance condition is close to the similar
condition used in the freedom of choice literature, when the instrumental value of
3For a survey of the freedom of choice literature and a closer discussion of these issues, see
Baujard 2006.
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freedom is at stake4. Utility is incorporated in the ranking of opportunity sets by
the requirement of a dominance condition: if one prefers the alternative a to b, then
the singleton {a} is preferred to {b}. What determines the comparison of the set
is eventually strictly the comparison of the utility derived from the sets. The same
would hold with different interpretations of the preference, utility, evaluation or the
quantity of functionings. Similarly, in the weak dominance condition, what is more
important – for anybody –, is the quantity of functionings: “A person with a bigger
functioning bundle must have at least as high a standard of living as a person with a
smaller functioning bundle”. For this reason, the value at stake, the intrinsic value
of freedom, is similar in both conditions of dominance, whether in the approach of
standard of living or in the freedom of choice literature.
The minimal relativism condition is a minimal requirement to value the range of
choice of functionings in a wider set. Similarly in the freedom of choice literature,
the strong monotonicity condition, that captures the intrinsic value of freedom of
choice, sets that a further alternative, no matter what amount of utility – or level of
evaluation of the achieved life –is derived from it, always induces a wider range of
choice. On the contrary, according to a weak version of the monotonicity condition,
adding a new alternative to the set improves it, if and only if the new alternative is
likely to be chosen, i.e. if it is – or if it could be – a maximal element (according to
utility or any evaluation). The link between the systematic valuation of wider sets
and the valuation of the intrinsic value of freedom hence holds, provided that any
new alternatives makes the set bigger. The minimal relativism condition prevents
that any condition could be imposed to filter the new alternatives. For this reason,
the value at stake, the intrinsic value of freedom, is similar in both formal conditions,
minimal relativism and strong monotonicity.
It is now well-known that these two conditions, (weak) dominance and strong
monotonicity, are together inconsistent (see Gravel 1994, 1998, Puppe 1996), which
puts forward the impossibility to value both the intrinsic and the instrumental value
of freedom. To be able to account for utility in ranking opportunity sets, it is nec-
essary to accept a weak version of the monotonicity condition rather than a strong
one: any new alternative added to an opportunity set increases the utility derived
from the set if and only if the new alternative is likely to be chosen, i.e. if it is – or if
it could be – a maximal element. On the contrary, a further alternative, no matter
what amount of utility it provides, always induce a wider range of choice. Therefore,
valuing the intrinsic value of freedom requires a strict version of the monotonicity
4For a survey of the freedom of choice literature and a closer discussion of these issues, see
Baujard 2006.
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condition. As it is impossible to consider both versions of the monotonicity mean-
while, one cannot consistently value of the intrinsic and of the instrumental value of
freedom. In parallel, Sen’s CA is based on two different objects – functionings and
capabilities –, capturing two distinct values per se – the outcome aspect of freedom
or its instrumental value on the one hand, and the opportunity aspect of freedom or
its intrinsic value on the other hand. The result here at stake echoes a now standard
conclusion in the freedom of choice literature: it is not possible to capture two dis-
tinct prudential values in a single ranking. A third conclusion is then the following:
Pattanaik and Xu’s result may be interpreted as the inconsistency between the two
different notions of freedom carried in Sen’s CA.
4 Facing the diversity of the capability approach
Let’s now go back to the discussion of relativism. The valuation of choosing between
different kinds of valuable lives is required by Amartya Sen’s approach5, as we have
seen above, but not by any capability approach. Martha Nussbaum, who aims
to develop a partial theory of justice (see Robeyns 2005), designs an Aristotelian
conception of the good life, leading to a substantial list of what functionings are
valuable, rather than others, no matter who you are and what tastes and moral
values you have (see Nussbaum 1995).
As Qizilbash (1998: 56) points it out, “Nussbaum thinks, with Aristotle, that
there is only one good, virtuous or flourishing life”. This yields to the proposition
of a concrete list of valuable functionings, to the exclusion of others. If just a single
type of life is to be acceptable, it is not important to focus on the diversity of
available choices to combine commodities differently : the only relevant information
is to check how the functionings at stake are achieved. This move has an important
semantical consequence: a functioning and a capability does not have the same
definition in Sen’s and in Nussbaum’s capability approach (see Robeyns 2005: 100;
Lessmann 2006). In Sen’s works (see especially his early works, such as Sen 1985),
a capability is a set of combinations of functionings, different in level and types; a
functioning bundle is a list of different achieved doings and beings. In Nussbaum’s
version of the CA (see Nussbaum 2000), a capability is a list of ten categories of
valuable functionings, taken as dimensions (in which: life; bodily health; bodily
integrity; senses, imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation;
5When speaking of Sen’s CA, we rather mean “Sen’s primary approach”. His view has indeed
evolved since 1985, until he has once accepted some basic capability lists in very specific situations.
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other species; play; control over one’s environment). On the contrary, the achieved
level of these dimensions is specified in the functioning space. We will though stick
to Sen’s terminology in this paper to be consistent.
What is important to a person according to Nussbaum’s version of the CA is
to get the highest level of each basic functioning, not to be able to choose between
different notions of the good life. It is a universalist view, rejecting the possibility
for a contradictory view about ranking two situations. The ranking of two bundles
of functionings x and y has to respect the overall view of a good life, which means
there is just one possible ranking of them. In a nutshell, minimal relativism condition
does not hold in this approach. A third conclusion derives from this assertion of
the link between capabilities and the relativism condition is that Pattanaik and
Xu’s result does endanger Sen’s CA which is based on the valuation of functionings
and capabilities. On the converse, it does not shake Nussaum’s approach which is
not committed to this notion of relativism, focusing on an aristotelian definition of
the good life. Therefore, the scope of Pattanaik and Xu’s result is limited to Sen’s
capability approach, not the the whole CA.
5 Two commensurable notions of freedom and a
possibility
I have just argued that the impossibility concerns this only view of the CA which is
defended by Sen, in which both the intrinsic and the instrumental value of freedom
should be valued. I now propose some tracks to go beyond these dead-ends and
restore a possibility, faithful to Sen’s project. This solution requires to design a
specific modality of commensurability between these two accounts for freedom.
The most common method of commensurability is weighting. Following J. S.
Mill (1866: book 6, chapter 12, 7), this would amounts to base all judgements on
one unique meta-value, likely to be called ‘utility’. As Sen intended to throw away
welfarism out the door (see Sen 1970a, 1970b, 1979a, 1979b, 1979c, 1985b), we may
assume he does not want it back from the window. Hence a faithful account for his
project would require to give a genuine importance to both value, the opportunity
aspect of freedom on the one hand, the outcome aspect of freedom on the other
hand. Different kinds of commensurability respecting this duality of values do exist.
In order to built a notion of well-being based on diverse prudential values (see
Griffin 1986: 85-89), Griffin suggests to challenge the idea of continuity in judging
8
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the overall notion of well-being. By difference with the definition of lexical order
(or ’trumping’) where ‘any amount of A outranks any amount of B’, he proposes
another form of incommensurability: ‘enough of A outranks any amount of B’. This
proposition consists in considering discontinuity in the process of comparison of two
distinct values6. He also applies this reasoning elsewhere: “It is rational of me to
think that no amount of stresses and strains, so long as they remained below the
threshold just roughly indicated, could outweigh the value of my autonomy. Stresses
and strains below that threshold still have a negative value, but still no amount of
them would add up to the value of living life autonomously. I have elsewhere called
this feature of certain pairs of values ‘discontinuity’ (...). Addition is here defeated;
one cannot add certain negative values, no matter how many, so that they become
equal to a certain finite positive value.” (Griffin 2002: 131) In other words, if you
have very little A, you attach much importance to it, in comparison to B. When
you happen to have more of A, B becomes more important as well; when you have
enough of A, B is becoming the most important value.
Following Griffin, a corresponding assertion would make much sense in our con-
text: ‘enough functionings outranks any amount of capabilities’. We devote firstly
more importance to outcomes over opportunities, at least when the amount of out-
comes is relatively low. In other words, functionings, when very few, are more
valued than capabilities; this is true up to a certain threshold, defined over some
basic and objective functionings. Over this threshold, capabilities may be valued
as such. Hence, relativism and dominance both have some intrinsic importance, but
not in the same context.
What would be the specific modalities of a discontinuous condition ? The under-
lying threshold may be interpreted, for instance as the limit above which the person
has access to a minimum quantity of commodities necessary to survival. When fac-
ing a serious deprivation, a lack of functionings is the most urgent value to take into
account when designing a policy. When the deprivation is going down, the capacity
to choose between different kinds of lives is being more important. Two modalities
may capture the idea of discontinuity. The first modality corresponds to the most
extreme case of discontinuity. When a certain level of functionings has been reached,
there is a case for valuing capabilities as such. When just functionings were at stake
in the first case, just capabilities are considered as important. In this process, we
have moved from a pure ‘basic functioning view’ to a pure ’capability approach’. In
this view, Nussbaum’s view is retained in the case of deprivation, whereas, in less
6As a matter of fact, the introduction of discontinuity in the freedom of choice literature allows
for possibilities while valuing both utility and freedom of choice. See Baujard and Gaspart 2006.
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problematic settings, Sen’s relativist view is the view at stake. Along with better
consequences, just one kind of life is favored at the first stage, and a wider diversity
of kinds of lives becomes acceptable and is valued on a second stage. Let’s now turn
to the second modality. Rather than focusing on a single value in each case (above
or under the threshold), the two values now have discontinuous relative importance.
When they are low, functionings matter more and dominance condition should ap-
ply, putting aside the condition of relativism in case of incompatibility. Along with
higher outcomes (meaning higher achieved functionings), a wider and wider diver-
sity of kinds of life becomes acceptable, until a threshold above which capabilities
matter more – and minimal relativism applies before all. In this view, Nussbaum’s
approach and the relativist approach are both retained in all settings but each of
them are devoted a decreasing importance when, respectively, the outcome aspect
of freedom and the opportunity aspect of freedom has been sufficiently satisfied. In
each case, the continuity condition has to be reformulated because it prevents from
capturing the idea of discontinuity in the context of a ranking of functionings and
capability sets, or rather, it should be substituted to the new discontinuity condition.
Henceforth, this new structure, whatever the modality, rules out the inconsistency
between minimal relativism and weak dominance.
Can we now propose such a positive result? In the first modality, as there is
no risk of inconsistency between the two conditions since they apply to different
settings, the answer is yes even though the proposition in itself might seem a little
disappointing. But in the second modality, the task is not so straightforward. Let’s
recall Sen’s position : “Having more of each relevant functioning or capability is a
clear improvement, and this is decidable without waiting to get agreement on the
relative weights to be attached to the different functionings and capabilities (Sen
1992: 46)”. He does not want to commit to any specific commensurability between
the two objects so as to let it open to a wide range of theories. He has therefore ac-
cepted the risk of strong incompleteness when discussing the ‘intersection approach’
(Sen 1992: 46-48). Yet, Pattanaik and Xu’s result implies that he should also avoid
the risk of impossibility. We now know it is not in itself possible to value function-
ings and capabilities meanwhile because it means a commitment to two different
inconsistent values. As the conditions, taken together, impose some restrictions,
it is necessary to take into account these limits in the process of describing what
relativism or dominance would mean and when it applies. In other words, we need
a more structured framework to be able to evaluate each of them and combine the
importance of each. Formulating the discontinuity condition in itself is a commit-
ment to a kind of commensurability, and it requires to compare on a similar basis
the mathematical formulation of functionings and capabilities. Hence, any way out
10
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the impossibility requires a more structured framework, which forces to give up with
the ambition of allowing for an almost unlimited range of different theories. There
are a diversity of consistent relativist capability theories, but not as large as what
Sen would first pretend. As as consequence, we do not need to throw the baby out
with the bath water: Pattanaik and Xu’s result does not force us to give up with
the capability approach, but it does points out that many theories following Sen’s
approach could be inconsistent. Now, more structured frameworks, with specified
settings, are still likely to capture Sen’s intuition.
Our proposition consists in accepting a discontinuity in the importance of the
two values: on the one hand, the outcome aspect of freedom, capturing the value of
functionings, which is at stake in Nussbaum’s approach, and, on the other hand, the
importance of the opportunity aspect of freedom, capturing the value of capability,
which is based on a primary assumption of relativism, an essential feature of Sen’s
approach. In the strongest case of deprivation, the Nussbaum approach, consisting in
focusing on the achieved basic functionings necessary to keep away from starvation
and to live in dignity, is therefore considered as the adapted theory. The role of
relativism becomes more important when deprivation is going down. Hence, the
discontinuity solution provides a generalization of the CA in the sense that it merges
the idea of Nussbaum and Sen’s in a single approach. This solution is, surprisingly
enough, able to reconcile a universalist view – that of Nussbaum – and a relativist
view – in a same framework. As these are two opposed views, they should indeed
always be inconsistent. Nussbaum defend a top-down view: the expert defines what
functionings are basic and important. Sen defends a bottom-up view: each person
develops her own view about what functioning is valuable and the over-all judgment
should be based on these bottom assessments. In the discontinuous framework, we
refuse to stand for one view against the other in all cases. Being universalist makes
sense when what is at stake is survival or minimal dignity, which does not prevent
from valuing choice per se in other cases. We therefore argue for a middle-solution
between the ‘top-down’ and the ‘bottom-up’ position. The relative importance of the
two values is different according to the context (the particular situation of the person
we are valuing the standard of living of) at stake7. Furthermore, the definition
(meaning what functionings are retained to define it) and the level (meaning what
level of each basic functioning) of the threshold might be different according to the
culture at stake (the cultural context of the evaluation). In the universalism vs.
relativism debate, we therefore defend a local justice sort of equilibrium.
7This position echoes the commitment of many economists who studies normative results in
economic environnement. See Maniquet (1999: 807).
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6 Conclusion
The basis of the capability approach (CA) was recently attacked by a paper by Pras-
anta Pattanaik and Yonghseng Xu: the CA is strongly committed to two substantial
principles, dominance on the one hand, and relativism on the other hand. The au-
thors has shown these two principles, along with a harmless continuity condition,
are together inconsistent.
On the one hand, this paper aims at discussing the interpretation of this result.
I have here proposed an interpretation of Pattanaik and Xu’s conditions and their
result, which means to be consistent with the literature on the capability approach.
Firstly, the formulation of the weak dominance condition supposes there exists a set
of relevant functionings that are recognized as valuable to all individuals, which is not
typical of the ambitious Sen’s project. Secondly, weak dominance corresponds to the
valuation of the outcome aspect of freedom when minimal relativism corresponds to
the valuation of the opportunity aspect of freedom. Thirdly, the impossibility proves
to be related to some other well-known result in the freedom of choice literature,
establishing the inconsistency between the intrinsic and the instrumental value of
freedom. Lastly, it just applies to a conception of the standard of living based on
both functionings and capabilities, hence committed to relativism. In other words,
Nussbaum’s CA is not shaken by the impossibility, just Sen’s approach is.
On the other hand, this paper aims at proposing a way out from the impossi-
bility. I have indeed claimed there is a way to restore a possibility, which would
remain faithful to Sen’s project. Firstly, the track for a solution is based on the idea
of discontinuity between the two notions of freedom. Secondly, any way out the im-
possibility requires a more structured framework. As the conditions, taken together,
impose a restriction, it proves necessary to give up with the ambition of allowing
for an almost unlimited range of different theories, as asserted by Sen. Thirdly, this
proposition makes a point in the universalism vs. relativism debate, arguing for a
middle-solution between the top-down and the bottom-up position.
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